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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the impact of multiple blockholders identity on the relation between 
family firms, excess control rights over cash flow rights, and expropriation of minority 
shareholders, in the specific case of Indonesia by using a panel of Indonesia companies over 
the period 2006-2008. Three research questions are investigated: 1. What is the impact of 
family firms on expropriation of minority shareholders; 2. What is the impact of excess 
control rights over cash flow rights on expropriation of minority shareholders; 3. To what 
extent does multiple blockholders identity moderate the relationship between family firms, 
excess control rights over cash flow rights, and expropriation of minority shareholders. 
In the theory review, agency theory and stewardship theory are introduced as theoretical 
foundation, followed by the discussion of corporate governance in Indonesia context. While 
agency theory specifies the agency problems namely principal-agent conflicts and principal-
principal conflicts; stewardship theory discusses that managers are considered as good 
stewards who will act in the best interest of the owners which ideal for explaining 
governance in the family business context. 
In regards to the methodology, ten testable hypotheses are generated for empirical analysis. 
Multiple regression analysis of panel data applies Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
to test the impact of multiple blockholders identity on the relation between family firms, 
excess control rights over cash flow rights, and expropriation of minority shareholders.  
Finally, the research questions are answered: there is positive correlation between family 
firms and expropriation of minority shareholders; excess control rights over cash flow rights 
has positive impact on expropriation of minority shareholders; and multiple blockholders 
identity namely another family as the second largest blockholders as well as institutional 
investor generate disparate significant impact on expropriation of minority shareholders. The 
existence of another family as the second largest blockholders creates expropriation more 
severe for minority shareholders while the presence of institutional investor is notable to 
lessen the positive impact of family firms and excess control rights over cash flow rights on 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Keywords: Family firms, excess control rights over cash flow rights, multiple 
blockholders identity, and expropriation of minority shareholders 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Many empirical studies show evidence that 
many publicly traded firms outside Anglo-
Saxon countries have concentrated 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 
2002). Such ownership structures may 
mitigate or exacerbate agency problems. 
On the one hand, the presence of a larger 
shareholder or blockholder, defined as 
individual or entity that own at least 5% of 
a firm’s equity (Mechran, 1995; Faccio & 
Lang, 2002), is more efficient in mitigating 
the conflict between agents and principals 
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as it reduces the free-ride problem and 
maximizes incentives to undertake value-
enhancing interventions (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). On the other hand, the 
presence of a majority shareholder may 
give rise to extreme conflicts between 
principals due to a majority shareholder is 
able to exercise control over the company 
and extract private benefits of control 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). 
Claessens et al. (2000) show that with the 
exception of Japan, more than 50% all 
publicly traded firms in East Asian 
countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) are controlled by 
families and that the top 15 families 
control significant shares of country 
wealth. The researchers further discuss that 
East Asian firms also showed a high 
divergence between cash flow rights and 
control rights, that is, the largest 
shareholders was often able to control a 
company’s operations with a relatively 
small direct stake in its cash flow rights.  
Villalonga & Amit (2006) argue that 
family firms have strong incentives to 
monitor management’s behavior thus 
lessen the conflict between agent and 
principal in the company. Moreover, 
family firms have salience characteristic 
compare to other types of ownership 
structure that is they wish to maintain their 
business with an intrinsic character which 
more likely to appoint a member of the 
family as CEO in order to strengthen the 
families’ control (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Faccio & Lang, 2002; Peng & Jiang, 
2010). Here, family’s CEO acts as a 
steward for the company and his behavior 
will not diverge from the interest of the 
family business because the steward seeks 
to obtain the goals of the company (Davis 
et al., 1997). Nevertheless, family firms 
are often associated with the conflict 
between controlling and minority 
shareholders which raise the opportunities 
of expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001) which defined by 
Johnson et al. (2000) as the transfer or 
diversion of company resources by the 
controlling shareholder to the detriment of 
minority. 
Strong legal institutions and regulatory 
regimes may act as external mechanism to 
shield minority shareholders from 
expropriation (La Porta et al., 1998). 
However, Young et al. (2008) argue that 
such mechanism is likely to be less 
effective in the emerging countries due to 
their uncertain institutional environment, 
ineffective or non-existent takeover 
markets, and poor organized managerial 
labor market. Peng et al. (2009) suggest 
that in this kind of environment internal 
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mechanisms of corporate governance may 
play a larger role in protecting benefit of 
minority shareholders. 
The presence of multiple blockholders as 
internal mechanism is crucial for enhance 
governance mechanism (Faccio et al., 
2001; Attig et al., 2009). Supporting this 
argument, Lemmon & Lins (2003) and 
Jiang & Peng (2011b) provide the 
evidence based on their study of family 
firms in several East Asian countries that 
the existence of multiple blockholders may 
prevent family firms gain private benefits 
at the expense of minority shareholder.  
One dimension of multiple blockholders 
structure is multiple blockholders identity 
which appears to be important (Holderness 
& Shehan, 1988). The identity of multiple 
blockholders may matter due to 
shareholders have heterogeneous 
incentives, preferences, and capabilities 
when they invest in a firm (Becth et al., 
2002; Thomsen & Pederson, 2000). 
Furthermore, Attig et al. (2009) discuss 
that the monitoring role of the second 
largest blockholders is seemed to depend 
on its identity.  
As one of emerging economies, Indonesia 
offers an interesting setting for examining 
linkages between family firms and 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Capulong et al. (2000) provide evidence 
that the highly concentrated structure of 
ownership in the country, which is family-
based ownership, enables controlling 
shareholders to obtain control unequal to 
their share of ownership and extract 
private benefits from minority 
shareholders and company’s resources.  
Based on the discussion above, it seems to 
be consensus that having multiple 
blockholders is pivotal for increase 
protection of minority shareholders toward 
expropriation practices conducted by 
majority shareholder. Nonetheless, the 
conceptual and measurement of multiple 
blockholders identity especially on the 
relation of family firms and expropriation 
of minority shareholders remains under-
examined. 
This research will evaluate the effect of 
multiple blockholders identity in family 
firms in the context of emerging economy. 
From a resource-based view standpoint, 
multiple blockholders represent valuable, 
rare, and inimitable resources, which may 
limit a family firms’ ability to obtain 
certain control structures likely to 
expropriate minority shareholders (Jiang & 
Peng, 2011b).  However, whether the 
identity of the multiple blockholders is 
crucial in the term of their impact on 
expropriation of minority shareholders is 
yet to be examined. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the early study of Berle and Means 
(1932), corporate governance has focused 
upon the separation of ownership and 
control as a central characteristic of the 
modern corporation. The authors 
emphasize the potential of divergence 
between owners’ and managers’ objectives 
arguing that this separation will create 
opportunity for managers to expropriate 
company resources for their own private 
benefits. This issue is formalized by 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) who introduced 
the shareholder model which also be 
known as agency theory. It based on the 
premise that managers, as agents of 
principals (shareholders), can engage in 
decision making and behaviors that may be 
inconsistent with the maximization of 
shareholder wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The principal-agent model which has been 
addressed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
was based on the basic rationale that if 
both parties – principal and agent – to the 
relationship are utility maximizers there is 
a good reason to believe that the agent will 
not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The authors believe that 
divergence of interests between owner and 
manager leads agents to fail to maximize 
the welfare of the principal. They continue 
by explaining that the agent’s actions in 
running the business using the principal’s 
resources may deviate with the owner’s 
main objective of maximizing their 
investment. The actions employed by 
managers who are the core of decision 
making process in the corporation will 
sometimes result in negative impacts to the 
principal. Agents are assumed to be self-
interested and likely to pursue goals for 
their own interests thus could damage 
principal wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
Prior academic findings suggest that large 
shareholders are important in reducing the 
traditional agency problem between 
managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The 
presence of large shareholders may 
decrease the conflict between principal and 
agent because their large equity holdings 
give them higher incentive to collect 
information and monitor management 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and also their 
voting power gives them the ability to 
force management to act in the interest of 
the shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). 
However, these large shareholders may 
give rise to the conflict among principals 
because a majority shareholder is able to 
employ control over the corporation and 
extract private benefits of control from 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Faccio et al., 2001).  
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Principal-principal conflicts highlight the 
relationship between owners, focusing in 
particular on problems between majority 
and minority shareholders. Young et al. 
(2008) argue that the principal-principal 
conflicts are likely to be especially severe 
when firms’ ownership and control rights 
are concentrated in the hands of one large 
shareholder or blockholder who is 
individual or entity that own at least 5% of 
company’s equity (Mechran, 1995; Faccio 
& Lang, 2002). Dharwadkar et al. (2000) 
and Morck et al. (2005) state that most 
contribution under this principal-principal 
perspective refers to emerging countries, 
where the diffuse patterns of concentrate 
ownership, combined with weak external 
governance mechanism, result in frequent 
conflicts between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders. 
Stewardship theory contrasts directly with 
agency theory. Donaldson & Davis (1991) 
introduce that the theory presents a 
different model of management, where 
managers are considered as good stewards 
who will act in the best interest of the 
principals. Davis et al. (1997) discuss that 
stewardship theory takes a broader view of 
human behavior, proposing that agent’s 
behavior is pro-organizational and 
collectivistic and has higher utility than 
individualistic self-serving behavior. 
Further, the authors state that the steward’s 
behavior will not diverge from the interest 
of the organization because the steward 
seeks to obtain the goals of the 
organization. Donaldson (1990) argues 
that steward searches for higher level 
needs, such as self-actualization, through 
the fulfillment of personal values and 
aspirations. 
Bubolz (2001) argues that stewardship 
theory is ideal for explaining governance 
in the family  business context due to 
family business principals’ deep emotional 
investment as well as their personal 
satisfaction, motivation, and reputation 
which are tied to the family enterprise 
(Ward, 2004). Within this context, the 
family business owners adopt the role of 
the steward in serving their organization 
rather than themselves and also they have 
high motivation to serve their business 
interests, and as a result they receive 
intrinsic satisfaction when the business 
advances and succeeds (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). Family members are 
concerned about the business because it is 
part of their collective legacy and is often 
the primary assets of the family (Arrȅgle et 
al., 2007). Therefore, the control 
mechanisms and agency costs associated 
to agency theory as being necessary to 
control opportunistic and self-serving 
managers are not necessary (Davis et al., 
1997).  
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The theoretical framework presented in the 
previous section will be used to develop 
the testable hypotheses for the study. The 
basis of the hypotheses is that the multiple 
blockholders identity which focuses on the 
second largest blockholders will moderate 
the relationship between family firms, 
excess control, and expropriation of 
minority shareholders in Indonesia 
publicly listed companies. In this paper, 
family firms (H1) and excess control (H2) 
indicate the possible effect of certain 
ownership and control structure on 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Further, the identity of the multiple 
blockholders which categorized into 4 
identities namely, another family, 
government, financial institution, and other 
company (H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b, 
H5a, H5b, H6a, and H6b) are represented 
to investigate the moderating effect of 
multiple blockholders identity on the 
relation between family firms, excess 
control, and expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
The proposed hypotheses of this study as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 
1 
: There is positive 
correlation between 
family firms and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
Hypothesis : There is positive 
2 correlation between 
excess control rights over 
cash flow rights and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
Hypothesis 
3a 
: The positive correlation 
between family firms and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders is stronger 
when the second largest 
blockholder is another 
family. 
Hypothesis 
3b 
: The positive correlation 
between excess control 
rights over cash flow 
rights and expropriation 
of minority shareholders 
is stronger when the 
second largest 
blockholder is another 
family. 
Hypothesis 
4a 
: The positive correlation 
between family firms and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders is stronger 
when the second largest 
blockholder is 
government. 
Hypothesis 
4b 
: The positive correlation 
between excess control 
rights over cash flow 
rights and expropriation 
of minority shareholders 
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is stronger when the 
second largest 
blockholder is 
government. 
Hypothesis 
5a 
: The positive correlation 
between family firms and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders is weaker 
when the second largest 
blockholder is 
institutional investor. 
Hypothesis 
5b 
: The positive correlation 
between excess control 
rights over cash flow 
rights and expropriation 
of minority shareholders 
is weaker when the 
second largest 
blockholder is financial 
institutions.  
Hypothesis 
6a 
: The positive correlation 
between family firms and 
expropriation of minority 
shareholders is weaker 
when the second largest 
blockholder is other 
company. 
Hypothesis 
6b 
: The positive correlation 
between excess control 
rights over cash flow 
rights and expropriation 
of minority shareholders 
is weaker when the 
second largest 
blockholder is other 
company. 
The research model in figure 1 shows the 
presumed relationship between family 
firms, excess control rights over cash flow 
rights, multiple blockholders identity, and 
expropriation of minority shareholders as 
stated in the hypotheses. 
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Research Method 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model for the research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study will use a panel data of publicly 
listed firms in Indonesia during the period 
of 2006 to 2008. The main resources 
regarding data of ownership structure and 
financial indicators for this project are 
Orbis, Datastream, and Worldscope data 
sources.  
This paper at hand will apply family firm 
and excess control as independent 
variables to test expropriation of minority 
shareholders as dependent variable. It 
follows former studies on this correlation 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Attig et al., 2008) to set up multiple 
blockholders identity namely another 
family, government, financial institution, 
and other company to test moderating 
effects of this identity factor on the 
relationship between family firms, excess 
control, and expropriation of minority 
shareholders. In line with prior empirical 
studies (Faccio et al., 2005; Peng & Jiang, 
2010; Jiang & Peng, 2011b), this project 
will apply financial leverage, and firm risk 
to control for company characteristics. 
Firm age and firm size (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Berkman et al., 2009; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011b) also will be used as control 
variable. Finally, accounting transparency 
will be included to examine whether 
increasing accounting transparency leads 
to better stock performance (Peng & Jiang, 
2010; Jiang & Peng, 2011b).  
Multiple regression analysis to panel data 
will be used in this project to gain insight 
into the relation between family firms, 
excess control, multiple blockholders 
identity and expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Two statistical models will 
be employed to test the hypotheses of this 
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study. In the model 1, the estimation of 
moderating effect of multiple blockholders 
identity on expropriation of minority 
shareholders will be tested by family firm 
as independent variable and all of control 
variables while in the model 2, the 
moderating effect of multiple blockholders 
identity on expropriation of minority 
shareholders will be examined by excess 
control rights over cash flow rights as the 
predictor variable. 
RESULT 
Using panel data for 187 firms during 
2006-2008, this study finds that family 
firms (b = -0.202; p value = 0.041) and 
excess control rights over cash flow rights 
(b = -0.086; p value = 0.039) decrease the 
company stock performance, representing 
more expropriation of minority 
shareholders. The presence of another 
family as the second largest blockholders 
creates expropriation of minority 
shareholders more severe, signifying 
principal-principal conflicts (b = -0.239 
and p value = 0.000 for model 1 and b = -
0.317 and p value = 0.000 for model 2). 
Meanwhile, institutional investor as the 
second largest blockholders delivers 
positive impact on company stock 
performance (b = 0.204 and p value = 
0.006 for model 1 and b = 0.094 and p 
value = 0.045 for model 2), indicating that 
institutional investor have the capability to 
dampen principal-principal conflicts 
between majority and minority 
shareholders. However, the impact of 
government (b = -0.001 and p value = 
0.990 for model 1 and b = -0.071 and p 
value = 0.168 for model 2) and other 
company (b = 0.099 and p value = 0.262 
for model 1 and b = -0.040 and p value = 
0.381 for model 2) as the second largest 
blockholder on the correlation between 
family firms, excess control rights over 
cash flow rights, and expropriation of 
minority shareholders are not significant. 
DISCUSSION 
Regarding family firms and expropriation 
of minority shareholders, this study finds 
evidence to support previous finding that 
family firms often associated with 
potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Lemmon 
& Lins, 2003; Kim & Lee, 2003; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011b). Expropriation of minority 
shareholders is made easier where rules 
and regulation fail to protect investor 
rights and systems are more prone to 
corruption (Young et al., 2008). Better 
formal legal protection of investor rights in 
developed countries, may decrease the 
amount of expropriation of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). On the 
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contrary, emerging countries typically do 
not have an effective and predictable rule 
of law which in turn, creates a weak 
governance environment (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). Empirical study by Carney & 
Gedajlovic (2002a) find that ownership of 
public listed companies in Indonesia is 
highly concentrated in the hands of family, 
which may control and manage them as 
sources of personal and family wealth 
enhancement. The evidence of this 
entrenchment was also supported by non-
transparent accounting practices, non-
market based transactions, strong 
controlling shareholder groups, and weak 
minority shareholder rights (Young et al., 
2008).  
Turning to the excess control rights over 
cash flow rights on expropriation of 
minority shareholders, the result of this 
study shows a positive correlation between 
excess control rights over cash flow rights 
and expropriation of minority 
shareholders. This paper supports 
empirical finding by Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997) who argue that when discrepancy 
of a large shareholder’s control rights and 
cash flow rights is large, the greater his 
abilities to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Peng & Jiang (2010) argue 
that family firms choose certain control 
structures such as excess control rights 
over cash flow rights in response to the 
formal institutions that often do not 
promote mutually beneficial impersonal 
exchange between economic actors. 
Consequently, this increases the principal-
principal conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders.  
Hofstede (2001) categorized Indonesia as a 
country with high score in power distance 
and characterized by collectivism. The 
collectivism dimension identifies that 
people are belong to ‘in group’ that take 
care of them in exchange for loyalty. There 
are several cultural attributes that derives 
from these dimensions, such as respect for 
age and social position, group orientation, 
and importance of relationships within a 
community (Hofstede, 2001). Many 
businesses in Indonesia are established by 
joint work of different families due to they 
have ethnic similarity or friendship ties. 
For instance, Salim family is well-known 
for their closeness with the family of 
former Indonesia president, Soeharto. 
Bank Central Asia, one of the biggest 
banks in Indonesia and Indofood Sukses 
Makmur, the largest food processing 
company in Indonesia and the world’s 
biggest producer of instant noodles, are 
examples of those family partnerships. The 
collectivist culture in the country seems to 
advocate coalition form amongst different 
families in business. However, in most 
cases of emerging economies, formal 
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institutions such as laws and regulations 
regarding accounting requirements, 
information disclosure, securities trading, 
and their enforcement are either absent, 
inefficient, or do not operate as intended 
(Young et al., 2008). This results in 
relational ties, family connection and 
coalition which in turn lead to potentially 
expropriate of minority shareholders (Peng 
& Heath, 1996).  
Shleifer & Vishny (1986) and Kochkar & 
David (1996) suggest that institutional 
investors have the potential to force 
companies to adopt governance reforms by 
leveraging their voting power and media 
influence. By leveraging their ownership 
power to enforce managers and controlling 
shareholder into adopting governance 
reforms, institutional investors have the 
capability to minimize the principal-agent 
conflicts and principal-principal conflicts 
that arise when executives or majority 
shareholders pursue policies that benefit 
them-selves at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Wahal, 1996).  
Even though insignificant, the negative 
standardized coefficient of the second 
largest blockholder government (both in 
model 1 and 2) signs that expropriation of 
minority shareholders is more likely when 
government holds large portion of stake in 
firm. The result may confirm finding by 
Nguyen (2008) who find a negative 
influence of government as the second 
largest blockholder on the firm value. On 
the other side of coin, although statistically 
insignificant, the positive standardized 
coefficient of the second largest 
blockholder other company in model 1 
indicates that company shareholding in 
family firms generates positive impact on 
cumulative stock return, thus delivering 
lower expropriation of minority 
shareholders. It might confirm the 
empirical study of Gedajlovic & Shapiro 
(2002) who find the evidence of positive 
relationship between corporate 
shareholdings and company performance 
in Japanese publicly listed companies.  
With regard to the impact of other 
company as the second largest 
blockholders on the correlation between 
excess control rights over cash flow rights 
and expropriation of minority shareholders 
(model 2), interestingly, this study finds 
that the presence of other company as the 
second largest blockholders delivers 
negative correlation on company stock 
performance. Indeed, the result is 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, it 
denotes that other company as the second 
largest blockholder might intensify the 
level of excess control rights over cash 
flow rights, indicating more potential 
expropriation of minority shareholders. An 
answer for this finding can be related to 
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the other feature of corporate in emerging 
economies namely business groups. 
Large family businesses often are 
organized around business groups, with 
different affiliated companies being run by 
various family members or branches 
(Wilkinson, 1996). On the one side, 
business groups in emerging economies 
may provide advantages because they can 
substitute for weak institutional 
environments in capital, labor, and product 
markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Li et 
al., 2006). On the other side, they tend to 
be large cumbersome organizations that 
carry coordination and administration costs 
(Claessens et al., 2002). More importantly, 
for corporate governance reasons, law 
transparency in coordinating and allocating 
resources between the affiliated members 
make difficult for minority shareholders to 
identify and challenge unfair intra-group 
transactions (Chang, 2003) since the 
networks provide significant opportunity 
for collusion or other unethical 
transactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
Khanna & Rivkin (2001) and Claessens et 
al. (2002) argue that business group 
affiliation provides a means by which 
controlling shareholders can expand their 
control rights over cash flow rights and 
thus increases the likelihood of 
expropriation of minority shareholders, 
which causes principal-principal conflicts. 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMENDATION 
As emerging economies have their own 
characteristics compare to developed 
economies, resolving principal-principal 
conflicts in these countries requires 
creative solutions which may beyond 
standard approaches.  In emerging 
economies, ownership concentration such 
as family firms became an important factor 
to potentially expropriate minority 
shareholders (Jiang & Peng, 2011b). Yet, 
eliminating concentrated ownership is not 
a realistic solution due to the lack of 
supporting institutions such as laws and 
enforcement regimes in the countries (La 
Porta et al, 1998). This study aims to 
examine whether multiple blockholders 
identity has competency to limit the 
likelihood of expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Further, this study will serve 
fruitful insight regarding relation of 
multiple blockholders identity and 
expropriation of minority shareholders 
especially in Indonesia context as one of 
emerging economies countries. 
This study is subject to several limitations. 
A first limitation of the study is that the 
results may not generalize to other 
companies and countries. This study 
investigates principal-principal conflicts in 
one country as the institutional setting, 
making future research using other settings 
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promising. A second limitation of this 
study concerns the proxy for the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
This study employs only cumulative stock 
return to measure expropriation of 
minority shareholders. Future research 
should use other indicators to denote 
principal-principal conflicts such as related 
party transactions or excessive 
compensation. Finally, in the terms of 
institutional investor, this study does not 
distinguish different categories of 
institutional investors, such as bank, 
pension fund, and mutual fund. Such 
distinctions are important because various 
types of institutional investors may exhibit 
differing preferences and objectives 
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). Therefore, 
future study may explore the impact of 
different types of institutional investors on 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
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